Yet critics argue that Hin Kong isn’t exactly what energy analysts might call “a brand new’’ development — but rather a version of an old one which was previously called off due to environmental and regulatory issues: Bo Nok, the coal-fired power plant. If so, that would seem to indicate that a losing project was re-animated under new terms of reference —sited in a new location, fueled by a different energy source—without opening things up again for competitive bidding.
This leads to some question, because Thailand’s IPP (Independent Power Producer) Rules are meant to provide that all projects need each its location and fuel (both location specific and fuel-specific). If they were circumventing that process, as the memo indicates is the plan, that would be a significant departure from standard rules for purchasing energy.
Gulf’s reach goes beyond Thailand. In July 2025, the company purchased a 60% stake in Laos’ Pak Lay hydro project, with an estimated capacity of 770 MW for $128 million (https://www.forbes.com/sites/phisanuphromchanya/2025/07/23/billionaire-sarath-ratanavadis-gulf-takes-over-lao-hydro-power-project-in-128-million-deal). Although widely publicized as a step to further regional energy exchange development, reporting indicates that Gulf or its related companies may have secured two of the other Laotian concessions – the 900 MW Pak Baeng and the 750 MW Pak Lao dams under non-traditional procurement conditions.
Notably, these projects’ reported PPA rate—around 3 baht per kWh—has raised eyebrows of analysts for coming at a hefty premium to the regional norms. It is also reported that delays in the commercial operation date (COD) have led to contractual disputes, possibly including arbitration in Singapore, but these are unconfirmed reports.
What these cases have in common is a recurring dynamic. In several other projects — at Hin Kong, Pak Lay, Pak Baeng and so on — Gulf Energy has come into the picture after initial nods to the project or acquired controlling stakes after processes changed.
Nothing in this process is necessarily illegal, but the timing and scale of successive developments have prompted some to ask if it is possible that the group has been given informal preferential treatment. This conjecture is bolstered by Gulf’s growth in key energy projects, often in contexts where competitors were excluded or frameworks adjusted afterwards.
The implications are significant. If confirmed, they could raise questions not just about Gulf’s corporate governance but also about Thailand’s commitment to transparent procurement. That kind of oversight, though, could imperil the aura of independence and integrity long associated with his public persona if he is not able to solve what the market appears to believe are a complex web of conflicts.
So far, no official wrongdoing has been alleged. But as the investigations mount and new documents become public, the line between strategic foresight and regulatory favoritism is growing difficult to discern.